Iran has escalated its warnings over the Strait of Hormuz by openly identifying undersea communications cables as potential targets in a future phase of its conflict with the United States and its allies. The threat puts a largely invisible part of the internet’s infrastructure at the center of an already dangerous maritime standoff. Iran’s warning about the cables came from Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps spokesman General Hossein Mohebbi, who described the lines as “legitimate new targets.”
Mohebbi said seven major cables cross beneath the strait and carry internet and commercial data. IRGC political deputy General Yadollah Javani subsequently said Iran could destroy those connections if attacks damaged Iranian infrastructure, describing the move as part of the country’s possible response to renewed U.S. escalation. ABC News reported Javani’s warning as a direct threat to the cables and other American and allied assets.
The geography makes the threat consequential even if cutting the lines would not switch off the global internet. Networks including Asia-Africa-Europe-1, FALCON, and Gulf Bridge International serve the region, with routes and landing stations connecting the Gulf to Europe, Africa, and Asia. Reuters’ explainer identified AAE-1, FALCON, and GBI among the major systems in the area, while noting that several Gulf states—including Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia—host landing points.
The likely impact would be regional disruption, congestion, and higher pressure on surviving routes rather than a worldwide blackout. Iran International, citing the International Cable Protection Committee, said five active cable segments pass through the Strait of Hormuz and account for less than one percent of international bandwidth. That figure understates the importance of the chokepoint to Gulf connectivity: financial services, cloud platforms, government networks, and ordinary consumer traffic can all be affected when a concentrated group of cables is damaged.
There is also a practical distinction between threatening a cable and successfully disabling it. Deliberate seabed sabotage requires locating the system, reaching it with divers or specialized equipment, and avoiding detection or interception. Repairs can take much longer in a conflict zone, particularly when maintenance ships cannot safely reach the fault. The Red Sea crisis demonstrated how vulnerable cable corridors can become after several cables were damaged in 2024, with shipping hazards and military activity complicating restoration.
International law adds another layer to the escalation. Submarine cables are protected under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, while civilian communications infrastructure generally remains protected from attack unless it qualifies as a military objective under the laws of armed conflict. Iran’s own communications could also suffer if cables serving Iranian landing points or shared Gulf routes were cut, making any strike potentially self-damaging as well as escalatory.
The warning fits a broader pattern of governments treating the ocean floor as a contested security domain. Britain has tracked Russian submarines and vessels near critical cable and pipeline networks, and a Russian ship was forced away from British waters after lingering close to transatlantic cable routes. TeleGeography estimates that hundreds of active undersea cable systems now form the backbone of international communications, while the Internet Society says roughly 97–98 percent of intercontinental internet traffic travels through them.
For now, Iran’s statements function as both deterrence and signaling: Tehran is warning that a wider conflict could expand from missiles, ships, and energy infrastructure into the digital supply lines beneath the sea. Whether the cables remain untouched may depend less on their technical vulnerability than on whether Iran concludes that attacking them would create more enemies—and more damage to its own networks—than strategic advantage.
